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LEARNING McNAMARA'S LESSONS:
How THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
ADVANCES THE RULE OF LAW
Peter M. Shanet

The end of the Cold War has not diminished either political
or scholarly interest in the allocation of governmental authority
with respect to the use of military force. This is as it should be.
Our post-Vietnam military forays into Iran, Lebanon, Grenada,
Libya, Panama, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia' amply demonstrate the continuing relevance of the debate. If anything, the reduced likelihood that local and regional military conflicts will erupt
into superpower confrontation reduces the disincentive for the United States to deploy military force in the pursuit of discreet military
and foreign policy objectives. Before the nation multiplies these
experiences too many more times, thoughtful citizens ought consider the processes by which the government decides how our military
forces should be used.
Nearly all recent academic articles on war powers-as well as
two important recent books-focus on the ultimate question of law
on this subject: Whom does the Constitution authorize to commit
United States troops to military hostilities? There exist at least five
different positions on this question:
John Hart Ely,' Louis Fisher,3 and Jules Lobel4 argue that

t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh College of Law. I would like
to thank Gerald F. Burch for his able research assistance and my colleague Professor
Jules Lobel for his generous willingness through our discussions to help strengthen an
argument with which he disagrees.
1. See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 808-17,
839-44 (1996).
2. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:

CONSTIUTIONAL LESSONS OF

VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3, 7 (1993).
3. See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 11 (1995).
4. See Jules Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 61, 75
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the President is constitutionally empowered to deploy military force
on his own initiative only in emergencies that preclude the pursuit
of advance congressional authorization. They acknowledge no general presidential power to use military force to protect national
security. Each specifically resists making a lawyerly leap from the
President's universally recognized authority to repel sudden attacks
to any broader power to respond unilaterally to national security
threats wherever they may arise.5 These authors acknowledge a
history of episodes in which Presidents have deployed military
force unilaterally, but each insists either that such episodes are
beyond the purview of the legal war powers debate or, if they are
not, that a history of usurpatious practice cannot change our constitutional framework.6
At the other end of the spectrum, Robert Turner7 and John
8
Yoo argue that the President enjoys unilateral authority to deploy
United States forces in any situation other than the initiation on a
major scale of offensive hostilities. Their positions echo official
State Department doctrine articulated during the Vietnam War.
Legal Advisor Leonard Meeker then argued that the President's
responsibilities for foreign relations encompass "the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military opera-'
tions when the President deems such action necessary to maintain
the security and defense of the United States."9 And, he left no

(1995).
5. See ELY, supra note 2, at 6-7; FISHER, supra note 3, at 6-8; Lobel, supra note 4,
at 70.
6. See ELY, supra note 2, at 9-10; FISHER, supra note 3, at 191; Lobel, supra note
4, at 71.
7. See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, 34- VA. J. INT'L L.
903, 906-10 (1994).
8. Actually, I am here understating Professor Yoo's conclusion as to the scope of
presidential discretion in war making. Professor Yoo argues that the framers did not understand the declaration of war as an authorization for war, but rather as a declaration of
a state of affairs between the United States and other nations intended to settle their
"formal, legal relationship," and to justify different standards of American government
behavior towards United States citizens with regard to their rights and duties. John C.
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other Means: The Original Understanding of War
Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 245 (1996). Thus, under Professor Yoo's interpretation,
the President never needs advance authorization for military initiative, but is subject always to congressional control through its funding powers. See id. at 295.
9. Leonard Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of
Viet-Nam, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 474 (1976), reprinted in SHANE & BRUFE, supra note 1,
at 772.
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doubt that pursuant to his argument the President's judgments in
this respect were to be deemed legally authoritative:
The Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to
determine whether the circumstances of a particular armed
attack are so urgent and the potential consequences so
threatening to the security of the United States that he
should act formally without consulting the Congress.'"
Between these two positions, at least three others exist in the
literature. Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, formerly assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, has
argued for a Youngstown-like approach." Unlike Legal Advisor
Meeker, Professor Dellinger concedes that Congress could, if it so
desired, expressly constrain the President in exercising military
force in most situations.' 2 Absent such constraints, however,
whether the President may use armed forces in particular circumla Justice Jackson-on the nature, intent, and
stances dependsimpact of the President's actions and on the full legislative context
in which his initiative would go forward. 3
Professor Peter Spiro has taken a more historically oriented
approach, urging that long-standing historical practice has categorically confirmed both the requirement of congressional authorization
for "the massive use of force against an enemy capable . . . of
marshaling substantial force," as well as the President's unilateral
power to engage in small-scale "strike operations" in defense of
American interests.' 4 Between these poles lie the problematic cases: open-ended deployments of United States troops in unstable or
hostile environments. Presidents may initiate these deployments "for
protective, humanitarian, or peacekeeping purposes,"' 5 but, because
of their sometimes protracted nature, as well as their potential to
create war, history confirms that they are subject to congressional
regulation.' 6

10. Id.
11. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating
President Truman's seizure of steel mills during the Korean War).
12. See Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: PresidentialPower and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 113 (1995).
13. See id. at 116.
14. Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338,
1348, 1352-53 (1993) (reviewing ELY, supra note 2).
15. Id. at 1354.
16. See id. at 1354-55.
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Professor Jane Stromseth, while pursuing interpretive methods
akin to those of Professor Spiro, finds less play in the constitutional scheme for wholly discretionary presidential action. She finds
historical confirmation for the President's powers to initiate peacetime deployments of troops for foreign policy purposes, as well as
to engage in the limited use of force "to rescue American citizens
abroad whose lives are in imminent danger."' 7 She disagrees with
Professor Spiro's conclusion that the President is otherwise authorized to engage in "strike operations" for non-rescue purposes. 8
The thoughtful scholarship offered in support of each of these
five positions suggests strongly that no one position is likely to
elicit authoritative legal consensus-ever. This literature also provides strong reason to believe that, except in the clearest cut
case-namely, the requirement of congressional authorization for
"the massive use of force against an enemy capable . . . of marshaling substantial force' 9-the judiciary will never enter into this
debate significantly.
In a way, what is most striking about this entire body of literature, however, is that, despite the disparate legal conclusions proffered, these authors exhibit very little disagreement about what is
at stake, from the point of view of sound decision-making process,
in the allocation of military decision-making authority. According
to the prevailing wisdom, what Congress can bring to the process
of decision making with regard to the deployment of troops is
democratic legitimacy and more inclusive deliberation. What the
President brings to military policy making is "effectiveness." 2'
Congress, it is supposed, can insure "broad political support in the
war making process,"'" while the executive can bring to bear its
advantages in speed, expertise, access to confidential information,
and coherence.' On their face, every one of these procedural at-

17. Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE LJ. 845, 882 (1996) (reviewing FISHER, supra note 3.)
18. Id. at 885-86.
19. Spiro, supra note 14, at 1348.
20. See Stromseth, supra note 17, at 858.
21. Gary Born, Review Essay: The President's War Powers, 23 TEX. INT'L LJ. 153,
163. See also, e.g., Strornseth, supra note 17, at 887; Lobel, supra note 4, at 73; ELY,
supra note 2, at 4.
22. See Born, supra note 21, at 163; Peter J. Spiro, Old Wars/New Wars, 37 WNM.&
MARY L. REv. 723, 725 (1996) (reviewing FISHER, supra note 3, and WILLIAM C. BANKS
& PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SEcuRrrY LAW AND THE POwER OF THE PURSE
(1994)); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx.
L. REV. 833, 844 (1972).
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tributes would seem to be an important part of sound governmental
decision making in the military arena. But, according to the conventional wisdom, it is an unfortunate institutional reality that the
allocation of power to the President or to Congress necessitates
trading off among these virtues. In delineating the respective powers of the legislative and executive branches, we allegedly have to
trade off decision making that is representative against decision
making that is skilled.a
To understand the practical stakes of war powers debates in
these terms, however, is simply inaccurate, at least with respect to
a very important set of cases. That is, there is every reason to
believe that, with regard to prolonged commitments of military
force to hostile encounters, the executive branch is likely to engage
in very poor decision making unless Congress has been brought
fully "on board" with regard to the policy-making process. And, to
prove the point, one could hardly imagine a more compelling testament than Robert S. McNamara's 1995 memoir of his life as Secretary of Defense, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of
Vietnam. The executive branch decision making that McNamara
portrays was slow, sloppy, ill-informed, and in some respects incoherent. A more vigorous assertion of congressional influence could
not possibly have made things worse-and might well have made
things better. The choice we faced as a nation was not between
checks and balances and effectiveness, but between checks and
balances and the truly terrible policy making we endured.
Part I below reviews the McNamara memoir and its demonstration of the ineffectiveness of uni-branch military policy making, at
least under particular conditions. Part II will consider why the
pathologies of Vietnam War decision making are not likely to be
unique-that is, why the realities of executive branch organization

23. Another "value" that Congress was intended to contribute to military policy making
is its relative slowness, as compared to the executive, in making decisions to go to war.
See ELY, supra note 2, at 3-4. The legislature, Madison supposed, would be less interested than the executive in making war, and, as Justice Story later observed, a large legislative body would be slower to decide for war than the more efficiently constructed executive branch. The problem, however, with using these arguments to determine an allocation
of military policy making power between Congress and the executive is that these arguments still leave "war" undefined. If, on these grounds, we read the Constitution as requiring congressional authorization for any non-emergency deployment of United States
troops-for the reason, that is, that any such deployment could lead to war-then it is
hard to see why Congress would not have to authorize preliminarily any executive foreign
affairs move, whether or not involving troops, that could precipitate war. As far as I
know, there is no support for such an argument.
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and its decision-making process are likely to re-create those pathologies when Congress is only tenuously involved in resolving the
most basic policy questions regarding military engagement. Part III
will argue that, if I am right about the dynamics of policy making,
then the values of sound military decision-making process are
actually well served by preserving a state of ambiguity as to the
allocation of military decision-making authority in all but the easiest cases. I conclude by arguing that, from this perspective, the
War Powers Resolution is not a failure, but a success.
I. MCNAMARA'S WAR: THE FAILURES OF
EXECUTIVE POLICY MAKING
The rhetoric of presidentialism with regard to military decision
making and foreign policy generally portrays the executive branch
as a lean, mean policy making machine. The President, as one
person, can supposedly coordinate decisional processes and insure
policy coherence in ways that a 535-member legislature cannot. He
has access to confidential information, and knows how to keep a
secret. He can make decisions quickly. He can marshal expertise.
Much of McNamara's rhetoric harkens wistfully-and more
than a little ironically-to this ideal. He seems to measure his
failures by the imagined distance he and his colleagues fell short
of a heady brand of self-confident, hard-nosed, expert decision
making by brilliant men (and I do not here use that last noun
generically). But this is an ideal of decision making that, by
McNamara's account, was nowhere realized during the Vietnam
years. Every key decision that McNamara recounts belies the
ideal's implicit arrogance. Indeed, conceit among key decision
makers, McNamara prima inter pares, contributed mightily to the
tragic sequence of events they helped sustain.
The decision-making processes described by McNamara were
consistently, and with horrible results, ill-informed, shallow, hostile
to genuine debate, unwilling to confront uncertainties about basic
issues, and driven more by wishful thinking and by perceived
political momentum than by sound interpretations of fact. This was
a pattern forged early in the Kennedy Administration. Throughout
meetings in the Fall of 1961 among himself, President Kennedy,
and Secretary of State Rusk concerning how to respond to increasing guerilla infiltration from North into South Vietnam, McNamara
waffled in trying to decide whether to support sending more advisers, equipment, and even combat troops to Vietnam. He first sug-
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gested his endorsement, and then, in combination with Rusk, withdrew it. "Looking back," he writes, "at the record of those [1961]
meetings, it is clear our analysis was nowhere near adequate. We
failed to ask the . . . most basic questions ... ."' In explanation,
McNamara cites his inexperience, nadvet6, the sheer number of
problems clamoring for attention, and an unwillingness to confront
in a deep way "problems for which there were no ready, or good,
answers."' None of this, except inexperience, was to change over
an eight-year period.
The President's access to confidential information availed key
decision makers little in the quest for sound decision making. According to McNamara, "None of us-not me, not the president, not
Mac (Bundy), nor Dean, nor Max (Taylor)-was ever satisfied with
the information we got from Vietnam."' The inadequacy of written reports from both the military and from our embassy in Vietnam led the Kennedy Administration to stage special consultative
meetings in Hawaii at the headquarters of the United States military commander of the Pacific. There, McNamara and others
"would listen to a long series of briefings."'27 But the results were
not much better: "The crowded atmosphere and agenda often made
it hard to focus on the issues at hand and ensure we were receiving candid reports and thoughtful recommendations." ' McNamara
defends the meetings only in conclusory terms: "I believe we
would have been far worse off if the meetings had not been
held." 9 But, based on the details of his reporting, a larger number
of meetings would have yielded chiefly a larger volume of
unfocussed discussions, misleading reports, and shallow recommendations.
The problem of misinformation was multidimensional. The
South Vietnamese tended to relay to the United States only information that they perceived the Americans wanted to hear." Then,
American military commanders tended to put their own spin on
that information, affected both by "wishful thinking" and by mis-

24. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECr THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM

39 (1995).
25. Id. at 39-40.
26. Id. at 43.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. MCNAMARA, supra note 24, at 44.

30. See id. at 47.
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judgment as to the complexity of evaluating military success in a
guerilla war.3
The pace of decision making was also a problem. Key decisions were often delayed because of persistent disagreements within
the Administration over central issues. Once momentum for a decision developed, reluctant participants could find themselves going
along without ever forcing real debate on the persisting points of
doubt. This was tragically evident in the Kennedy Administration's
handling of the unraveling Diem Administration in South Vietnam.
Given Kennedy's premise that the War could not be won except by
the South Vietnamese themselves, the destabilization of the Diem
regime by Buddhist protests and Diem's violent retaliation might
well have counseled an immediate withdrawal. No such decision
was made, however, because key advisers within the Administration
could not bring themselves to consensus.32
Instead, what ensued was a chaotic, even bizarre decisional
process about whether to support the toppling of Diem through a
military coup. In McNamara's account, our action to set the coup
in motion began with a cable from Under Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman, Jr. to the new United States
ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.33 The draft cable
was sent to President Kennedy in Hyannis who said he would
'
agree to transmitting the cable "if his senior advisers concurred."34
According to McNamara:
George (Ball) immediately telephoned Dean Rusk in New
York and told him the president agreed. Dean endorsed it,
though he was unenthusiastic. Averell (Harriman,
undersecretary of state for political affairs), meanwhile,
sought clearance from the CIA. Since (Director) John
McCone was absent, he talked to Richard Helms, the deputy director for plans. Helms was reluctant, but, like Rusk,
went along because the President had already done so.3
Further rounds of such "clearance" occurred, everyone signing on
because of an assumption that everybody else, and, most important,
the President, had already done so:

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 48.
See id. at 50.
See id. at 52.
McNAMARA, supra note 24, at 53.
Id.
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[Even though key advisers were] deeply divided over the
wisdom of (Diem's) removal; no careful examination and
evaluation of alternatives to Diem had been made by me or
others; no high-level approach to Diem-with appropriate
carrots and sticks-had been attempted to persuade him to
mend his ways. Moreover, we allowed the controversy
concerning the status of Diem to overshadow de Gaulle's
proposal (to see neutralization in Vietnam). We never did
give it the consideration it deserved. 6
McNamara repeats his indictment of the quality of decisionmaking process regarding Vietnam in connection with virtually
every important policy determination made from 1961 until his exit
from government in 1968. With regard to the neutralization option,
the United States position was "replete with inconsistencies and
incongruities."37 "Before authorizing the coup against Diem, we
had failed to confront the basic issues in Vietnam that ultimately
led to his overthrow, and we continued to ignore them after his
removal."3
After Kennedy's assassination, it was left to Lyndon Johnson to
decide what course to take and, especially, to decide whether to
introduce significant numbers of United States combat troops into
Vietnam. According to McNamara, LBJ allowed the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to avoid answering key questions about the advisability of
military involvement: "We never carefully debated what U.S. force
would ultimately be required, what our chances of success would
be, or what the political, military, financial, and human costs
would be if we provided [the direct application of U.S. military
force]." '39 During 1964, LBJ refrained from a major build-up, but
he ordered the development of military plans and asked that a
resolution be drafted to give "congressional validation of expanded
U.S. military action in Indochina."'
Executive decision making again did not distinguish itself in
1965 when the Administration initiated the definitive escalation of
American involvement in the war. Johnson accepted the decision to
bomb North Vietnam because the weakening government in Saigon

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 70.
MCNAMIARA, supra note 24, at 107.
Id. at 120.
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looked too fragile to pursue any effective course of action without
the United States, and no obvious alternative to bombing existed.4 '
Once bombing began, however, protecting United States airbases
from the Viet Cong became a bootstrap argument for escalating the
introduction of ground troops.42 LBJ convened a working group to
review the key options, but it was rife with disagreement: "(Their)
presentation to the President was full of44holes."'43 The group again
"failed to confront ... basic questions."
As debates persisted over the proper course of action, Johnson
"brought to Washington a bipartisan group of elder statesmen who
became known as the Wise Men (sic) ... an impressive group
with knowledge, experience, and prestige."'45 Unfortunately, of
course, their knowledge was even less complete than that of official policy makers. Their military advice to Johnson was keyed
more to ideological predisposition than analysis of fact, and LBJ
altogether ignored their political advice to be far more candid with
the American public.' Two years later, when LBJ reconvened the
group for further advice, he even went so far as to disinvite those
"wise men" who had decided they disagreed with LBJ's policy.47
McNamara properly judges harshly the results of so much
inward-looking deliberation. Our policies were shaped by "loose
assumptions, unasked questions, and thin analyses."' We were
driven by a geopolitical assessment of China that was "totally
incorrect."'49 McNamara never succeeded in "forc[ing] a debate
within the administration on [the] fundamental issue" of accepting
a coalition government as a way to end the war5
Contrary to the myth of the unitary executive, the hierarchical
structure of executive authority did not promote well coordinated
policy making or implementation. According to McNamara, a key
part of the problem of shoddy decision making in connection with
the Diem coup was that Dean Rusk "failed utterly to manage the

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 171.
See id. at 174-77.
Id. at 162.
MCNAMARA, supra note 24, at 162.
Id. at 196.
See id. at 197-98.
See id. at 306.
Id. at 203.
McNAMARA, supra note 24, at 219.
Id. at 300.
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State Department and to supervise Lodge."'" As for resolving profound disagreements within the military, military leaders "never
fully debated their differences in strategic approach, or discussed
them with [the Secretary of Defense] in any detail. As Secretary of
Defense, I should have forced them to do both. ' 5 2 McNamara
sums up the executive's performance as a coordinated entity as
follows:
Underlying many . . . errors lay our failure to organize the
top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively
with the extraordinarily complex range of political and
military
issues, involving
the
great
risks
and
costs-including, above all else, loss of life-associated
with the application of military force under substantial
constraints over a long period of time. 3
Of course, it did not help that LBJ was denying his advisers key
information, such as a report from the former director of the socalled Navy Vietnam Appraisal Group that military victory was
impossible, and CIA Director Richard Helms' analysis that the
dangers for United States national security and foreign policy of
unilateral disengagement from Vietnam were limited. 4
In retrospect, McNamara seems clear as to the key process
failure that led to such disastrous decision making: "We failed to
draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank
discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military
involvement in Southeast Asia before we initiated the action." 5
As a result, it was not only the case that fundamental issues went
unexamined, but also that no firm basis of public support was ever
created to sustain the Administration's policy: 6
There is no "right" moment to obtain popular consent for
military action through a vote of Congress. Debate will
always arise over how and when to do so. The fact is it
must be done-even if a divisive vote risks giving aid and
comfort to our adversary. We did not do it, and we would
learn the hard way that a government must accept that risk

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 70.
Id.at 243.
Id.at 323.
MCNAMARA, supra note 24, at 306-07.
Id. at 322.
See id. at 266, 269.
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in order to lead a united country into war and maintain
support. Instead of working toward unity, we chose to
sweep the debate under the Oval Office carpet."'
As a result, the decision making that McNamara describes misjudged the "geopolitical intentions" of our adversaries, misperceiVed
the motivations of the leaders of South Vietnam, underestimated
the importance of nationalism as a force driving the Viet Cong
effort, and exaggerated the likely benefits to be realized from our
superior equipment and fire power. 8
II. WHY VIETNAM COULD HAPPEN AGAIN

The sobering lessons of Robert McNamara's account would be
chiefly of historical interest if the decision-making flaws he reveals
could be dismissed as idiosyncrasies of particular people and
unique circumstances. Such is probably not the case. McNamara
identified at least seven obstacles to sound executive branch policymaking process that were of key significance at various points
throughout the Vietnam debacle:
(1) Inexperience among key decision makers;
(2) An agenda overloaded with crises and difficult problems;
(3) An unwillingness to confront key assumptions;
(4) Reliance upon inaccurate information from non-United
States sources;
(5) An unwillingness to confront profound disagreements
among key policy makers;
(6) Peer pressure to "clear" controversial decisions; and
(7) Hostility to dissent.
Unfortunately, it is easy enough to imagine routine circumstances
that would unleash these identical forces in future episodes of
military decision making. The most serious of them, moreover, are
likely to occur or to be costliest when one or both of the following
circumstances is present: the United States engagement in a military action is of long duration and the executive feels compelled to
insulate itself from potential congressional criticism with regard to
the President's handling of a military initiative.

57. Id. at 191-92.
58. Id. at 321-22.
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The factor of "inexperience" is self-explanatory. Although Presidents, Secretaries of State and of Defense, and Directors of Central Intelligence may come to their respective roles with impressive
training, it is unlikely that there is anything like "being there" to
enable these key figures to comprehend fully the demands of their
respective roles. (Even if relevant agencies are staffed with knowledgeable career personnel, the principal officer is likely to be surrounded predominantly by other political appointees.) During World
War II, for example, Robert McNamara gained some presumably
valuable first-hand exposure to military managemept through three
years of work in the Army Air Corps Statistical Control Program. 9 For fourteen years thereafter, he rose successfully through
management ranks to become President of Ford Motor Company.'
None of this, it seems fair to say, prepared McNamara to deal with
problems of such logistical and geopolitical complexity as those
entailed in running the Pentagon-and as much is likely to be true
for any new Secretary of Defense. (On the contrary, McNamara
was probably ill-served by his experience in the sense that he was
indoctrinated to believe that military policy making, even in a
guerilla war, could be reduced to frameworks appropriate for purely logistical business management.") In terms of policy expertise,
key congressional leaders will always have an experience edge on
any new executive Administration.
"Agenda overload," similarly, will be a fact of life for any
Administration. But, it is most likely to be a problem for military
decision making when a military deployment extends for a significant period of time. With respect to what Professor Spiro calls
"strike operations," the crisis that is precipitating potential military
deployment is likely to be the agenda item that briefly drives ev-

59. See MCNAMARA, supra note 24, at 8-9.
60. See id. at 10-13.
61. McNamara writes:
I insisted we try to measure progress. As I have emphasized, since my years at
Harvard, I had gone by the rule that it is not enough to conceive of an objective and a plan to carry it out; you must monitor the plan to determine whether you are achieving the objective. If you discover you are not, you either
revise the plan or change the objective. I was convinced that, while we might
not be able to track something as unambiguous as a front line, we could find
variables that would indicate our success or failure. So we measured the targets
destroyed in the North, the traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the number of
captives, the weapons seized, the enemy body count, and so on.
Id. at 238.
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erything else off the President's screen. That circumstance, however, cannot be indulged for more than a matter of weeks, if that
long. After that, as other matters clamor for a Secretary's or for a
President's attention, there will be a profoundly felt need to shrink
the range of facts or issues under debate, to treat decisions already
made as beyond rethinking, and, in general, to economize in one's
concentration on any particular item. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that, as an operation drags out, important decisions will
often be made on the basis of decision makers' shallow analyses.
This dynamic, of course, will reinforce another bureaucratic
behavior that will always exist-an unwillingness to revisit key
assumptions. Precisely because the Presidency is so singular and
visible a political target, 2 there will be a built-in tendency not to
rethink key commitments, lest the President, as an individual, appear to be weak, indecisive, irresolute, or unprincipled. It would
have been politically very difficult for President Johnson to have
said something like, "We have reviewed our initial assumption that
the imperial ambitions of the Chinese Communists make it imperative to restrain North Vietnamese aggression, and we have changed
our mind." The longer a President becomes invested in any foreign
policy objective, the harder any such statement will become.
Note, moreover, how much harder it would likely be to revisit
key assumptions when Congress has never become fully engaged in
the deliberative process. In the event that a President seeks to
revisit the basis for action that both elected branches have genuinely supported, his capacity to persuade Congress of their joint initial
error will diffuse the political costs of changing course. If, however, the President chose to "go it alone" with respect to the fundamental choices underlying a foreign or military policy initiative,
Congress can provide him no equivalent political cover.
Decision makers rarely, if ever, can count on information that
is completely reliable. Even reliable information demands interpretation, which can be contested. The longer any enterprise persists,
the more opportunities for inaccurate information will arise. The
problem again will be intensified if Congress is not part of the
policy-making process. If non-United States sources understand that
the executive, but not Congress, is committed to an initiative on
62. For an important argument as to how the Presidency's "singularity" and "visibility"
increase the vulnerability of the office, see Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in
the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or
Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 827 (1996).

1997]

MCNAMARA'S LESSONS

1295

which foreign parties are relying, the temptation will loom large to
skew the information presented to United States intelligence agencies, and Congress will not be afforded the capacity to provide an
independent check on the reliability of that information. Moreover,
the executive will want to believe information presented to it that
confirms the rationality of decisions already made. There will be
too much political cost associated with being wrong.
If Congress and the executive do not share in a policy commitment, Congress's skepticism may also contribute to a siege mentality within the executive that will make it hard for administrators to
confront profound disagreements among key executive policy makers, no matter how persistent those disagreements. Largely to avoid
paralyzing the President through indecision, key actors in the Vietnam saga managed for years to paper over their differences or to
make compromises that ultimately rendered our policy incoherent.
The national security team LBJ inherited from the Kennedy Administration was "deeply split over Vietnam."' 3 As of fall, 1964,
there was a "substantial split" among LBJ's military advisers as to
whether or not to launch immediate air strikes against North Vietnam. Although all the armed services endorsed the air war by
February, 1965, the Army and Navy were far more pessimistic
than were the Marines and Air Force about what air strikes could
likely accomplish.' Similar disagreements later surfaced concerning the number of ground troops who ought to be committed to
the war effort.65 None of these conflicts was ever allowed to crystallize genuine public debate over the fundamental underlying issues.
The pressure to go forward, to leave doubts unexpressed and
differences unresolved, intensifies another decision-making trait that
is to some extent a universal characteristic of executive branch
policy making-a desire in each decision maker not to be the
"hold-out" in making a decision to which others appear committed.
Life is easily made uncomfortable for the person perceived as an
obstructionist in the path of accomplishing a presidential objective,
especially an objective as seemingly unambiguous as prevailing
over a clear adversary. The momentum behind the cable that precipitated Diem's overthrow dramatically illustrates the tendency.
McNamara characterizes most of the decision makers as signing on
63. MCNAmARA, supra note 24, at 101.
64. See id. at 175.
65. See id. at 192-94.
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reluctantly to a decision that each assumed had, for all intents and
purposes, already been made, and none was sufficiently adventurous to delay.'
The ubiquitous bureaucratic inclination toward "group think,"
exacerbated by the other factors just outlined, is also likely to
manifest itself in a hostility to the expression of dissent within the
executive. Dissent not only casts doubt on early decisional commitments, but it takes up everyone's time and calls into question
advice earlier rendered-and the advisers who rendered it.
McNamara details in his memoir how unresponsively key decision
makers responded to George Ball's arguments in 1964 and in
1965: first, that the Administration should pursue more aggressively
a political resolution to the Vietnam impasse,67 and, second, that it
should seriously limit its further deployment of ground troops to
Vietnam."8 Understandably, McNamara's own deepening conviction in 1967 that the United States should withdraw from Vietnam
rendered his continued leadership of the Pentagon untenable.69
It is entirely possible that the tragedies of Vietnam, both for
that country and for ours, could have been drastically curtailed had
the executive branch undertaken a more genuine policy making
partnership with Congress. LBJ was determined, instead, to prevent
well-informed public debate about his Vietnam objectives and
plans. He never publicly stated the singularity of his goal to win
the war, or, as McNamara puts it, the absence of any plan in 1964
to accomplish that objective."0 He withheld information about the
degree to which the United States escalated the air war in 1965."'
He failed to keep his 1964 promise to consult Congress closely in
the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.72 He made no public
statement regarding the extraordinary fiscal implications of the
intensified war effort.73
Had the executive branch been amenable to more serious congressional involvement in the development of Vietnam policy, it
would have been able to take advantage of the foreign policy experience of senior members of Congress. At least some such mem-

66.
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bers could have provided a sustained focus on Vietnam, even as
the executive struggled with other foreign and domestic policy
crises. Members of Congress would have felt freer than the
President's subordinates to test the key assumptions underlying
United States policy, and to challenge the quality of information
used to inform United States decision making. Disagreements
among policy makers would have been aired earlier, and greater
caution would have been exercised in making controversial decisions.
A more open process would have been more receptive to the
views of those within Congress who would have counseled restraint. As early as December, 1963, Senate Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield urged LBJ to pursue the neutralization of Vietnam as a
politically acceptable result. 74 Senator Wayne Morse was an early
and persistent critic of the war, whose views could have helped
catalyze a deeper debate within Congress had the relevant facts not
Senator
been concealed by the Johnson Administration.'
Mansfield opposed the buildup of troops in 1965,76 as did Senator
Russell, who urged the President to withdraw in light of the deeply
divided public view of the wisdom of a troop buildup.' LBJ never cooperated in fashioning an interbranch dialogue that would
have had to grapple with these views held by powerful Senators.
To observe this, however, is also to observe that the most
important question, from the standpoint of the national interest, is
not whether any particular military foray is formally lawful. After
all, Congress provided sufficient authorization for virtually every
aspect of the Vietnam War to address all constitutional requirements. What the national interest demands in any truly sustained
military effort is an ongoing congressional counterweight to the
pressures within the executive to avoid asking hard questions, to
cover up differences, to leave convenient information unexamined
and conceal inconvenient information, and to leave ambiguous,
even inconsistent objectives untested by analysis. That depends on
a depth of interbranch consultation that simply did not exist during
the Vietnam period.
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III. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, INTERBRANCH DECISION
MAKING AND THE RULE OF LAW

For those who believe in the rule of law, there is likely to be
much appeal in the work of John Hart Ely, Louis Fisher, and Jules
Lobel, on one hand, or of Robert Turner and John Yoo on the
other. That is because each of these sets of war powers scholars
has argued for an interpretation of the Constitution's allocation of
military authority that amounts to a bright-line rule. Implementing
any of their interpretations would make government legality or
illegality easy to spot; such is the advantage of clear rules for
operationalizing the rule of law.
In 1987, however, writing about the dynamics of interbranch
executive privilege contests, I noted the difficulty of adhering to
this model of the "rule of law" in settings in which Congress and
the President may legitimately entertain substantially different interpretations of their constitutional obligations. There are contexts, of
which the war powers controversy is perhaps the paradigm example, (1) in which each elected branch, following conventional methods of legal interpretation, may legitimately understand the requirements of separation of powers law very differently, and (2) in
which, for a variety of legal and institutional reasons, it is unlikely
that courts will ever intervene substantially.7 8 That is, there will
not be any institutionally designated umpire to announce the "one
right answer" to the major constitutional questions presented. In
such settings, it is far from obvious how best to implement constitutional law as a serious constraint on arbitrary political judgment
and as a source of genuine accountability to principled norms.
In such contexts, I argued that each elected branch, rather than
conceptualizing interbranch disputes as occasions to prevail in the
imposition of its legal views on the other, should accept that, to
some extent, each branch enjoys a "jurisdiction within which it is
permitted to interpret the Constitution independently."79 In such
settings, the rule of law is best served if both legislative and executive lawyers seek to articulate for their respective branches a
conscientious interpretation of the Constitution, faithful to the
"kinds of interpretive methods that characterize the legal culture

78.
Laws:
466-70
79.

See Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of
The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461,
(1987).
Id. at 470.
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generally."8 It is no affront to the rule of law if the articulated
doctrines of the elected branches conflict, so long as each branch
takes seriously its responsibility to formulate a coherent legal doctrine that accommodates "its particular institutional interests within
a legal framework that is justifiable under conventional, legitimate
forms of legal reasoning."'" If a conflict in the legal doctrines of
the respective elected branches poses difficulty in the resolution of
a particular dispute, then Congress and the President should undertake a problem solving approach that allows each branch to uphold
its sense of institutional obligation without attempting to resolve
the underlying legal disagreements in a definitive way." It is
through such a process, I argued, that the elected branches are
most likely to exhibit the commitments to accountability and mutual restraint that the rule of law demands.
There are, to be sure, some knotty issues to be confronted in
this approach. For instance, how shall we comprehend the possibility that Congress can evolve legal doctrine other than through
the enactment of statutes or that the executive can generate law
other than through statutorily authorized rulemaking or adjudication? My suggestion, following upon an important article by Michael Glennon," was that custom could be a source of law in
separation of powers disputes. In particular, making an analogy to
norm formation in the context of international law, I argued that an
elected branch's "doctrine" of executive privilege law could be
I
discerned from its behavior in particular disputes."
In 1995, then-Yale Law student Christopher Ford adopted arn
identical approach in analyzing the post-Vietnam evolution of war
powers law.' It is clear that, since the enactment of the War
Powers Resolution86 ("WPR") the executive branch has often resisted technical compliance with its formal textual commands. From
this point of view, the WPR has failed as law. And yet, as Ford
points out, if one reviews the actual behavior of the two branches,

80. Id. at 496.
81. Id. at 541.
82. See id. at 497.
83. See Michael Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109 (1984).
84. See Shane, supra note 78, at 478.
85. See Christopher A. Ford, War Powers as We Live Them: Congressional-Executive
Bargaining Under the Shadow of the War Powers Resolution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 613620 (1995).
86. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1994).
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it is clear that they have achieved a modus vivendi, an "effective
law" of war powers that balances a de facto legislative delegation
of "strike operation" discretion to the executive against a significantly constraining process within which the executive must proceed if it is intent on any lengthy or massive military deployment.
The WPR has supported, in other words, an interbranch dynamic
that has made each branch more accountable to its institutional
obligations.
The WPR embodies three key commands to the executive. In
committing United States military forces to hostilities or to situations in which hostilities may be imminent, the executive must: (1)
consult Congress to the extent practicable," (2) report within forty-eight hours of the relevant commitment,8 and (3) withdraw
within sixty or ninety days, if Congress does not affirmatively
authorize the military deployment. 9
For military operations intended to take but a few days to
execute, the WPR essentially leaves the President to his own discretion. President Reagan's invasion of Grenada and bombing of
Libya, President Bush's invasion of Panama, and President
Clinton's bombing of Iraq and expedition to Haiti exemplify such
operations. In none of these cases did the President acknowledge
that he was legally bound by the WPR. Nonetheless, in each of
these cases, the President did make a report to Congress within 48
hours of the commencement of the operation-just as the WPR
would require."°
In contrast, the WPR explicitly asserts Congress's entitlement
to decide whether the United States should go to war or place
itself on a war footing. Again, although President Bush denied his
need for legislative authorization, the fact that he sought explicit
congressional authority for Operation Desert Storm paid obvious respect to Congress's understanding of its own powers. He did not
seriously seek to deny that the deployment of tens of thousands of
American troops in defense against what was then believed to be a
genuinely powerful military adversary implicated Congress's war

87. § 1542.
88. § 1543(a).
89. § 1544(b).
90. See Ford, supra note 85, at 664 (Grenada), 668 (Panama); United States Air Strike
Against Libya, 1986 PUB. PAPERS 499 (Libya); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the
Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1183 (1993)
(Iraq); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti, 30 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1823
(1994) (Haiti).
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policy prerogatives. 9' Moreover, despite what must surely have
been the temptation to do otherwise, President Bush eventually did
not order United States troops to seek the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein-which would have gone beyond the scope of Congress's
authorizing resolution.'
Between the various brief post-Vietnam "strikes" and our one
full-scale war, the United States has also entered into a number of
more ambiguous deployments-most notably, in Lebanon, Somalia,
and Bosnia. In each case, an American President initiated a deployment on his own discretion, and then negotiated with Congress
over the degree to which the deployment would be governed by
express statutory constraint.93 In the case of Lebanon, Congress
went so far as to enact the only statute that has yet purported
formally to implement the WPR, providing a fixed period of authorization of United States troops to remain in Lebanon.94
Interpreting these events, John Hart Ely and Louis Fisher find
little evidence that Congress has recaptured its constitutional
prerogatives.95 Dean Ely clearly regards as a sham Congress's purported efforts to "restrain" the executive under the WPR. And,
indeed, there is probably a compelling case to be made that the
invasion of Panama, in particular, was a violation of international
law."
As for our own constitutional law, however, the picture does
not seem to Mr. Ford or to me to be anywhere so bleak. Despite
the executive's recurring broad claims of unilateral discretion, it
has, in fact, comported with Congress's dictates.' President Bush
did not go to war without congressional approval. In all cases,
Presidents have reported to Congress, as required.
It is true, of course, that various Presidents engaged in strike
operations without advance congressional approval. What is not
clear, however, is that Congress adheres to a view of the Constitution that renders such operations unlawful. Although Congress has

91. See Ford, supra note 85, at 669-78.
92. See Authorization for use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. 10201, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
93. See Ford, supra note 85, at 630-62 (Lebanon), 678-700 (Somalia); SHANE &
BRUFF, supra note 1, at 841-42, and FISHER, supra note 3, at 157-61 (Bosnia).
94. See Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805
(1983).
95. See FISHER, supra note 3, at xi-xiii; ELY, supra note 2, at 49.
96. See FISHER, supra note 3, at 146-47.
97. Dr. Fisher does not disagree with this conclusion. See id. at 133.
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never ceded to the President any formal acknowledgement of constitutionally based executive discretion in such endeavors, Congress
has routinely tolerated strike operations-correctly perceiving that
they pose no genuine threat to Congress's capacity to regulate
more substantial forms of military deployment.
As for Lebanon, Somalia, and Bosnia, it seems clear that each
of the elected branches used the ambiguity of its own powers-and
the ambiguity of the legal status of our military deployments-to
help leverage its bargaining position over the course of events. A
less vigilant Congress-the Congress of the 1960s, for example-could easily have allowed any of these engagements to become a version of Vietnam. In each case, however, Congress used
the WPR and its own claims to authority to force the executive to
sharpen its articulation of American objectives, respond to contrary
positions with regard to the executive branch's foreign policy analyses, and share substantial information with Congress. In every
case, the country experienced a better informed and more substantial intragovemment debate over military policy than the executive
mustered in the Vietnam era. In the cases of Lebanon and Somalia,
Congress helped set the stage for a relatively early withdrawal of
ground troops. In the case of Bosnia, congressional pressure presumably helped curtail what might have been a temptation to commit United States ground troops even prior to the Dayton accords.
With the Dayton accords in place, the United States deployment
had a far better defined mission than would have been the case
had the Clinton Administration moved earlier in that direction. It
also seems to be a mission that the American people accepts.
In the post-Vietnam era, Congress has become a more vigorous
participant in foreign military policy making." The pattern is unmistakable. That does not mean executive decision making has
consistently become wise. But, in nearly all cases, it has complied
with a system of accountability and justification that accords as
well with our rule of law ideals as one might reasonably hope in a
context not refereed by courts. Without the WPR, it might have
been a much harder system to sustain.
If the process were now to be reformed, it seems unlikely that
the key improvement needed is a requirement of formal congressional approval prior to strike operations. What we need is a genuine
congressional commitment after strike operations to an intensive

98. See Spiro, supra note 22, at 723-33.

MCNAMARA'S LESSONS

1303

and independent factual post-mortem regarding every military deployment. The knowledge that Congress is reliably committed to
such investigations would help assure that, in planning even strike
operations, the executive branch would truly confront and question
the key assumptions underlying its proposed initiatives, test the
information available to it, force key executive policy makers to
address seriously the disagreements among them, and engage in
intrabranch debate sufficiently open and receptive to dissent to
merit public confidence in the decisions ultimately reached.
Of course, from at least one substantive point of view this
version of the rule of law is truly disappointing. If you believe that
strike operation deployments of American military power are virtually never going to serve the interests of international justice, then
the process I would permit will seem an insufficient constraint on
American militarism. But conflating the goals of legality and sound
policy is, especially in this context, a mistake. There is apparently
a substantial consensus within Congress that the current "exigencies
of life . . . demand some degree of executive and military flexibility." In the face of such consensus, although law is a form of
politics, it is not a form of politics plausibly sufficient to protect
the world against improper assertions of American force. That is
what elections are for.
In short, for those military engagements that are unambiguously
"war," the WPR has effectively affirmed Congress's authority to
authorize or to forbear from military hostilities. In other deployments that portend lengthy and dangerous commitments of United
States troops, the WPR has created a framework for interbranch
negotiation that has helped to assure Congress a more significant
role in the regulation of military force. In strike operations, the
WPR has effectively delegated discretion to the executive, but it is
in these cases that the costs of Vietnam-style policy making pathology loom least. Congress can reduce even these costs by investigating such operations closely after the fact. Through such investigations, Congress would more effectively be asserting what it believes to be the primacy of its authority without formally denying
the executive a degree of discretion that, if experience is any
guide, Congress wants the President to have.

99. Ford, supra note 85, at 703.
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IV. CONCLUSION

What many war powers scholars yearn for-a consensus,
bright-line understanding of the constitutional allocation of military
policy making authority-is unlikely ever to occur. Congress and
the President approach the relevant task of constitutional interpretation with too many conflicting interests at stake, and courts are
unlikely to intervene seriously. That does not render such scholarship uninformative or even unpersuasive. It does mean, however,
that it is harder to jump from such analyses to an authoritative
conclusion that some executive military initiative is plainly lawful
or unlawful.
From the standpoint of the American polity, there exists, moreover, an inquiry into the history of any military deployment that
may be more pressing than, "Did Congress sufficiently authorize
it?" That more urgent question is whether Congress was sufficiently engaged in the policy making process to minimize the risks of
shallow, incoherent, self-indulgent policy making from which we
and the Vietnamese suffered so terribly during the Vietnam War.
If we are to understand what the "rule of law" demands in the
war powers context, I would argue, therefore, that we should seek
a legal theory that supports a form of interbranch interaction that
maximizes the potential for serious interbranch deliberation and
mutual accountability. The War Powers Resolution creates a framework supportive of that kind of dynamic."° Over time, under the
WPR regime, a pattern of interbranch accommodation may become
so stable that the President and Congress will be seen to have
evolved a joint conception of the relevant law, which the judiciary,
if it ever does involve itself in these issues, is most likely to uphold. That's fine. Constitutional law may be generated by actors
other than courts. Moreover, constraints other than law will always
be necessary to make sure our substantive decisions on military
deployment are wise.

100. Indeed, it provides in the war powers context what I have argued is precisely the
central element missing in executive privilege disputes, which would be necessary to sustain a constructive problem-solving dynamic (i.e., a set of written understandings within
which a modus vivendi can be implemented. See generally Peter M. Shane, Negotiating
for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44
ADMIN. L. REv. 197 (1992)).

